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POST LAFEYETTE MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR
REFUSING TO ZONE OUTLYING
DEVELOPMENT
Commercial development of unpopulated areas threatens the vitality
of central business districts and encourages municipalities to take af-
firmative steps to defend against urban blight.' As a protective meas-
ure, mid-sized cities often refuse to zone vacant land to allow the
building of shopping centers that would draw business from the central
business district.2 Developers challenge the denials of competitive
commercial uses on two grounds. First, municipalities do not possess
authority under the zoning power to control competition Second, the
denial of a competitive use is an illegal restraint of trade under the
1. The federal goverment announced a new program at the end of 1979 that permits mayors
to petition the Housing and Urban Development Agent (HUD) to withhold federally funded
projects aiding the construction of suburban shopping centers that threaten central business dis-
tricts. 3 ZONING AND PLAN. L. REP. 42-43 (June 1980). For a review of central business district
revitalization projects, see Weaver & Duerksen, Central Business District Planning and the Control
of Oudying Shopping Centers, 14 Uit. L. ANN. 57 (1977).
2. See, eg., Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980); Mason
City Center Assocs. v. Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979); Scott v. Sioux City, No.
79-4009 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 26, 1979); Allapattah Community Ass'n of Fla. v. City of Miami, 379 So.
2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Hubert Realty Co. v. Cobb County Bd. of Comm'rs, 245 Ga.
236, 264 S.E.2d 179 (1980); State ex rel Diehl Co. v. City of Helena, - Mont. _ 593 P.2d 458
(1979); Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County v. Lerner, - Va. ._., 267 S.E.2d 100 (1980). Cf.
State of Vermont District Environmental Commission #4 (Vermont prevented the development
of Pyramid Mall, a regional shopping center outside of Burlington). Vermont prevented the mall
under the Vermont Land Use and Development Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (1980).
The statute requires a permit for each commercial or industrial development involving more than
ten acres. Id §§ 6001(3), 6081(a). Before the State District Environmental Commission may issue
the permit, the project must comply with eleven criteria, including both traditional land use and
environmental considerations. Id § 6086. See In re Pyramid Co. of Burlington, No. S59-78CNM
(Chittenden Sup. Ct. April 21, 1980) (denying the developer's motion for summary judgment to
overturn the Commission's denial of the use). See generally R. HEALY & J. RISENBERG, LAND
USE AND THE STATES 40-63 (1976).
3. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Woolin, 387 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1968); Exparie White, 195 Cal.
516, 234 P. 396 (1925); Lippow v. City of Miami Beach, 68 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1953); Suburban
Ready-Mix Corp. v. Village of Wheeling, 25 Ill. 2d 548, 185 N.E.2d 665 (1962); Exchange Nat'l
Bank v. Village of Skokie, 86 Ill. App. 2d 12, 229 N.E.2d 552 (1967); Metro 500, Inc. v. City of
Brooklyn Park, 297 Minn. 294, 211 N.W.2d 358 (1973); Herman Glick Realty Co. v. St. Louis
County, 545 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. CL App. 1976); In re Lieb's Appeal, 179 Pa. Super. 318, 116 A.2d
860 (1955); In re Appeal of Stefonick, 1 Pa. Commw. Ct. 13, 271 A.2d 707 (1970); Board of
County Supervisors v. Davis, 200 Va. 322, 106 S.E.2d 152 (1958). The Vermont mall developers
are contesting the denial of the permit under the Vermont Land Use and Development Act, VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (1980). See generally note 2 supra.
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federal antitrust laws.4 This Note analyzes the efficacy of both grounds
and suggests a standard to determine when the federal policy for free
competition preempts municipal land use regulations.
I. DENIAL OF A COMPETITIVE USE UNDER THE ZONING POWER
Originally, the zoning power derived from the common law nuisance
theory.5 Property owners are entitled to use their land without unrea-
sonable interference from the activities of other landowners. 6 Courts
grant injunctive relief against an interference7 with property rights
when the harm to individual owners outweighs the benefit to society
from the continuation of the offending use.8 Zoning eliminates the
need for this balancing of interests in a particular case by limiting con-
flicting uses to separate districts.9 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Re-
alty' the Supreme Court ratified the practice of dividing land into
districts under different classifications." 1 The Court held that local gov-
ernment's authority to zone under its police power encompasses all
land use decisions which have a rational relationship to the promotion
of health, safety, morals, and the general welfare of the community. 12
A municipality, however, cannot regulate under the police power
without a delegation of authority from the state. 3 A municipality re-
ceives the power to zone from the state either through a general en-
abling statute' 4 or from the same constitution in the form of a home
4. Stouffer v. Town of Grand Lake, No. 80-A-752 (Colo. Oct. 9, 1980); Scott v. Sioux City,
No. 79-4009 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 26, 1979); Mason City Center Assocs. v. Mason City, 468 F. Supp.
737 (N.D. Iowa 1979). See State of Vermont District Environmental Commission #4. See gener-
ally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
5. See generally Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1449-50 (1978).
6. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 596-602 (4th ed. 1971).
7. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 602-06.
8. See notes 6-7 supra.
9. See Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932). But see
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915);
Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L. REV. 440;
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40
U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973).
10. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
11. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.14 (2d ed. 1976).
12. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
13. See generally E. BAsSETr, ZONING 12-15 (1936); 8 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 25.35 (3d ed. 1976); Note, Antitrust Law and Municial Corporations: Are Municipalities
Exempt from Sherman Act Coverage under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547, 1558-78
(1977).
14. E. BASSETT, supra note 13, at 27.
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rule provision."5 Most states model their legislative grants of authority
after the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of 1924.16 A city in a
home rule state enjoys a general police power, 7 which includes a ple-
nary power to zone. 18 Neither form of delegation of zoning authority
indicates that control of competition or protection of established busi-
ness interests is a valid zoning purpose. 9
All zoning laws affect competition through regulation of land with-
out being influenced by free market forces.20 By dividing a community
into districts, zoning necessarily restricts competition in the same uses
between geographic areas.2' A zoning ordinance that grants a competi-
tive advantage to an individual or group generally does not serve the
public and, therefore, is an improper exercise of the police power.2 2 A
land use classification, however, that serves a legitimate zoning purpose
is not invalid simply because of an incidental impact on competition.23
15. On home rule generally, see 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 13, §§ 4.82, 10.09-.14; Vanland-
ingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1969). On
home rule as the source for the zoning power, see 8 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 13, § 25.32; Note,
supra note 13, at 1559-60.
16. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ACT §§ 6-7 (1926). The act
grants power to a municipality to regulate land use "for the purpose of promoting health, safety,
morals or the general welfare of the community." See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926). See generally D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CON-
TROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT, 217-27 (1979).
17. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, [1980-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) T
63362 (10th Cir.).
18. See note 13 supra.
19. See, e.g., Second Norwalk Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 28 Conn. Supp. 426,
265 A.2d 332 (1969); Cape Ann Dev. Corp. v. City Council of Gloucester, 374 Mass. 825, 373
N.E.2d 218 (1978). See generally notes 13-14 supra.
20. See, e.g., Van Sicklen v. Browne, 15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 127, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786, 789 (1971);
In re Liebs Appeal, 179 Pa. Super. 318, 324, 116 A.2d 860, 865 (1955). See generally 3 ZONING
AND PLAN. L. REP. 33-39 (May 1980).
21. See Zaehring v. Township of Long Beach, 56 N.J. Super. 26, 151 A.2d 425 (1959).
22. Wyatt v. City of Pensacola, 196 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Pearce v. City of
Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659 (1962); State ex rel Diehl Co. v. City of Helena, - Mont.
593 P.2d 458 (1979).
23. Carty v. Ojai, 77 Cal. App. 3d 329, 143 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1978); Ensign Bickford Realty
Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Van Sicklen v. Brown, 15
Cal. App. 3d 122, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1971); Alachua County v. Reddick, 368 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979); Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 270 Md. 513, 312 A.2d 758 (1973); Board
of County Comm'rs v. Lightman, 251 Md. 86, 246 A.2d 261 (1968); Technical & Professional
Servs., Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 558 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Forte v. Bor-
ough of Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super. 346, 255 A.2d 804 (1969); Duddles v. City Council of W. Lynn,
21 Or. App. 310, 535 P.2d 583 (1975); Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 22 Utah 2d 143, 449
P.2d 989 (1969).
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Courts distinguish purposeful manipulation of the competitive ele-
ments in a community from incidental anticompetitive effects by focus-
ing on the primary reason for the regulation.2 4 When an ordinance
excludes one use while permitting a similar activity in the same area,
courts may discern an improper intention on the part of the zoning
authority to aid a particular party.25
A. The Manipulation of Competition Through Zoning
Courts consistently deny property owners standing to maintain a suit
under zoning laws to enjoin construction of competitive establish-
ments.26 Zoning ordinances that grant certain businesses a competitive
advantage by excluding similar enterprises are similarly unenforce-
able.27 The police power offers no justification for excluding compati-
24. See, e.g., Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971); Carty v. Ojai, 77 Cal.
App. 3d 329, 143 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1978); Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal.
App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Van Sicklen v. Browne, 15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 92 Cal. Rptr.
786 (1971); Second Norwalk Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 28 Conn. Supp. 426, 265 A.2d
332 (1969); Wyatt v. City of Pensacola, 196 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Fogg v. City of
S. Miami, 183 So. 2d 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Suburban Ready-Mix Corp. v. Village of
Wheeling, 25 Ill. 2d 548, 185 N.E.2d 665 (1962); Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118
N.W.2d 659 (1962); Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super. 346, 255 A.2d 804 (1969); Cun-
ningham v. Planning Bd., 157 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1956), modfledon othergroundr, 4 A.D.2d
313, 164 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1957); Duddles v. City Council of W. Lynn, 21 Or. App. 310, 535 P.2d 583
(1975); Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 22 Utah 2d 143,449 P.2d 989 (1969); Board of Supervi-
sors of Loudoun County v. Lerner, - Va. ., 267 S.E.2d 100 (1980).
25. See, e.g., Jeisy v. City of Taylorville, 81 IlL. App. 3d 442,401 N.E.2d 627 (1980); Pearce v.
Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659 (1962); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va.
128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
26. The problem arises most often when a zoning authority grants a variance that increases
the level of competition in the permitted use. See U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD
STATE ENABLING AcT 7 (1926). Most states allow variances to zoning ordinances under special
circumstances when strict application of a classification would impose an unnecessary hardship.
Puritan-Greenfield Improvement Ass'n v. Leo, 7 Mich. App. 659, 153 N.W.2d 162 (1967). See
CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 65906, 65911 (Deering 1979); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267(5) (McKinney Supp.
1978).
An interested business owner may seek to enjoin the operation of the variance to prevent the
construction of a competitive establishment. For cases denying standing to existing businesses to
protest variances allowing competition on adjacent property, see Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v.
Board of Appeals, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949); Cord Meyer Dev. Corp. v. Bell Bay
Drugs, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 211, 229 N.E.2d 44, 282 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1967). For cases denying standing
to protest variances that allowed competition a substantial distance from plaintiff's property, see
Swain v. County of Winnebago, Ill Ill. App. 2d 458, 250 N.E.2d 439 (1969); Kreatchman v.
Ramsburg, 224 Md. 209, 167 A.2d 345 (1961). But see Skaggs-Albertson's, Inc. v. ABC Liquors,
Inc., 363 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1978). See generally Mandelker, Control of Competition as a Proper
Purpose in Zoning, 14 ZONING DIG. 33, 34-35 (1962).
27. See, e.g., Exparte White, 195 Cal. 516, 234 P. 396 (1925) (invalidates bar on any further
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ble uses in the same area.28 Therefore, courts will presume an
improper discriminatory intent when ordinances benefit particular
business interests at the expense of competition from noninterfering en-
terprises.2 9
A proper zoning purpose, however, will validate a regulation even
though it has an anticompetitive effect. 30 Zoning considerations such
as traffic and fire hazards legitimize denial of new construction.3' In
addition, aesthetics and preservation of open space and the character of
a community will support a zoning authority's desire to prevent high
density development 32 by refusing building permits. 33 Moreover, re-
entry to commercial zone); Wyatt v. City of Pensacola, 196 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(invalidates three-year ban on uses of innovative dry cleaning solvent to allow ordinary dry clean-
ers grace period to adopt the technique); Fogg v. City of S. Miami, 183 So. 2d 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966) (disallows ban on drive-in uses to protect walk-in uses); Frost v. Village of Glen Ellyn,
30 J1. 2d 241, 195 N.E.2d 616 (1964) (discontinues ban on drive-in restaurants); Suburban Ready-
Mix Corp. v. Village of Wheeling, 25 Ill. 2d 548, 185 N.E.2d 665 (1962) (reverses denial of permis-
sion to build additional ready-mix plants); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Park Ridge, 74 Ill. App.
3d 647, 393 N.E.2d 623 (1979) (voids ordinance prohibiting carryout restaurants that allowed sit-
down restaurants); Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Village of Skokie, 86 Ill. App. 2d 12, 229
N.E.2d 552 (1967) (voids ordinance prohibiting combined car wash and gas station); Pearce v.
Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659 (1962) (reverses denial of shopping center use
on property surrounded by regional centers).
28. Under nuisance theory an existing business establishment cannot claim that activities of a
similar operation constitute an offending use. Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeals,
324 Mass. 427, 431, 86 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1949). See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
29. The beneficial effect of an ordinance on some businesses will not justify an absolute ex-
clusion of competitive uses under the police power. "The public welfare with which the City and
the courts must be concerned is the welfare of the whole community. A benefit or anticipated
benefit to a special group within the City is not enough." Fogg v. City of S. Miami, 183 So. 2d
219, 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). See Weaver & Duerksen, supra note 1.
30. See Second Norwalk Corp. v. Zoning & Planning Comm'n, 28 Conn. Supp. 426, 265
A.2d 332 (1969). Defendant was denied commercial use (1) to prevent competition with existing
business and (2) to avoid an increase in traffic. The documented intention to shield certain enter-
prises from competition did not void the ordinance that was valid on other grounds. Id at 431,
265 A.2d at 334.
31. See, eg., Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971); Second Norwalk Corp. v.
Zoning & Planning Comm'n, 28 Conn. Supp. 426, 265 A.2d 332 (1969); Allapattah Community
Ass'n of Fla. v. City of Miami, 379 So. 2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Alachua County v.
Reddick, 368 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Hubert Realty Co. v. Cobb County Bd. of
Comm'rs, 245 Ga. 236, 264 S.E.2d 179 (1980); Dawson Enterprises v. Blaine County, 48 Idaho
506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977); Cunningham v. Planning Bd., 157 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1956), modi-
fled on other grounds, 4 A.D.2d 313, 164 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1957).
32. City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 985 (1969); Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 180 Colo. 217, 507 P.2d 344 (1972);
Amalgamated Trust and Say. Bank v. County of Cook, 82 Ill. App. 3d 370,402 N.E.2d 719 (1980);
Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978).
33. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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strictions on the number of similar competing commercial uses permit-
ted in close proximity are enforceable to discourage the proliferation of
billboards,3 4 gas stations,35 and adult bookstores and movie theaters.
36
State courts disagree as to the propriety of considering the demand
for additional business in the formulation of a zoning regulation. Some
courts find that the requirement that building permit applicants prove a
need for a contemplated use improperly protects existing businesses
from competition.37 Other courts uphold the requirements because
they prevent the construction of businesses that the community cannot
support.38 Recent decisions accept need as a valid zoning consideration
only if the zoning authority has developed specific guidelines to deter-
mine when sufficient demand for development exists.39
34. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 23 Cal. 3d 762, 592 P.2d 728, 159 Cal. Rptr. 212
(1979).
35. Lucky Stores v. Board of Appeals of Montgomery County, 270 Md. 513, 312 A.2d 758
(1973); Board of County Comm'rs v. Lightman, 251 Md. 86, 246 A.2d 261 (1968); Hempturn
Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 197 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See Mosher, Proximity Regulation of
the Modern Service Station, 17 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 (1965) (no traffic or safety hazard results from
proliferation of gasoline stations, so the underlying objective of proximity ordinances must be to
limit competition).
36. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619
F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980).
37. See, e.g., Commission on Pollution Control and Ecology v. Worth James, 264 Ark. 144,
568 S.W.2d 27 (1978); Sun Oil Co. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 9 Ohio Misc. 101, 223 N.E.2d 384
(1966); In re Lieb's Appeal, 179 Pa. Super. 318, 116 A.2d 860 (1955). See generally Dabney,
Antitrust Aspects of Anticompetitive Zoning, ANTITRUST BULL. 435, 441-42 (1979).
38. See, e.g., Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971); Van Sicklen v. Browne,
15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1971); Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Mont-
gomery County, 270 Md. 513, 312 A.2d 758 (1973); Board of County Comm'rs v. Lightman, 251
Md. 86, 246 A.2d 261 (1968); Peterson v. Mayor of Palisades Park, 127 N.J.L. 190, 21 A.2d 777
(1941); Hempturn Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 197 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Richardson v. Zon-
ing Bd. of Review, 101 R.I. 194, 221 A.2d 460 (1966). See also Technical & Professional Servs.,
Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 558 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (lack of need for ceme-
tery is evidence use is not compatible).
Some courts, however, do not distinguish between zoning decisions based on need and im-
proper competition control. See Herman Glick Realty Co. v. St. Louis County, 545 S.W.2d 320
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. v. Andrews, 23 Misc. 2d 894, 196
N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
39. In Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County v. Lerner, - Va.. 267 S.E.2d 100 (1980),
plaintiff applied for a rezoning of his property to a "planned development shopping center classifi-
cation." The county denied the application in accordance with its comprehensive plan, which
established guidelines for new development, including a minimum population to support the new
development. The court affirmed the county application of standards from the comprehensive
plan.
While the term "minimum population to support" may be subject to the two interpreta-
tions advanced by the parties, we believe that the Board, acting within its discretion, was
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/5
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B. Zoning to Protect Established Commercial Centers
In some zoning cases courts have upheld an ordinance that restricts
growth in less developed areas in order to ensure the survival of estab-
lished commercial centers.4° In Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County,4 t for
example, the zoning authority prevented development in an isolated
area. The county refused to rezone the region adjacent to a freeway
from grazing to highway service because the new use would have ena-
bled tourists to bypass Beaver City completely.42 The zoning commis-
sion recognized a duty to protect the livelihood of local citizens before
permitting the development of an unpopulated area. 3
In Forte v. Borough of Tenafly44 the strong public interest in revital-
izing the central business district4 also justified variance denials for
certain suburban uses. The Borough of Tenafly enacted an ordinance
which disallowed any commercial use with an adverse effect on down-
town business46 in order to effectuate a plan that prohibited all retail
uses outside the city's core.47 The court emphasized that a municipality
entitled to interpret the term in the manner it thought would best implement the compre-
hensive plan, provided the interpretation was reasonable within the context of the lan-
guage employed in the plan.
Id at 10. See also Carty v. Ojai, 77 Cal. App. 3d 329, 143 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1978); Pillman v. Village
of Northbrook, 65 Ill. App. 3d 40, 382 N.E.2d 399 (1978); Braidwood v. City of Portland, 24 Or.
App. 477, 546 P.2d 777 (1976); Vermont District Environmental Commission #4.
40. City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 985 (1969); Carty v. Ojai, 77 Cal. App. 3d 329, 143 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1978); Ensign Bickford
Realty Corp. v. City Council of Livermore, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Second
Norwalk Corp. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 28 Conn. Supp. 426, 265 A.2d 332 (1969); Fal-
Ion v. Baker, 455 S.W.2d 572 (Ky. 1970); Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super. 346, 255
A.2d 804 (1969); Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 22 Utah 2d 143, 449 P.2d 989 (1969).
41. 22 Utah 2d 143, 449 P.2d 989 (1969).
42. The court deferred to the planning commission's finding that:
[A]ny tourist business which would go to the isolated junction area would be a loss to the
established businesses of Beaver City. . . . [A]ny earnings and profits which might be
engendered by the new establishment would tend to drain away into other towns of
comparable size to Beaver which lie in adjoining counties ....
Id at 144, 449 P.2d at 990.
43. Id
44. 106 N.J. Super. 346, 255 A.2d 804 (1969).
45. For an enumeration of the public's interests in the central business district, see Weaver &
Duerksen, supra note 1, at 60-63.
46. TENAFLY, N.J. ORDINANCE No. 939: "This district is intended for commercial and
wholesale services and small local convenience neighborhood service establishments and other
businesses not suited to the general retail business zone, and to provide uses which will not have
an adverse effect upon the downtown business core." Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super.
346, 349, 255 A.2d 804, 805 (1969).
47. Id
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may not exclude a use simply because it competes with a particular
enterprise.48 A municipality may choose, however, to benefit one zone
over another.49 The court stressed that any amount of incidental inter-
ference with competition, even a grant of a virtual monopoly over retail
business, cannot invalidate an otherwise legitimate classification. 50
Courts will presume an incidental effect on competition when a com-
prehensive zoning plan designates uses for a large area.51 A long range
plan may dictate the timing and location of commercial development
without discriminating against any one property owner. 2 Rezoning,
which prevents construction of a new shopping center, constitutes a
valid exercise of the police power when it coincides with a general plan
for orderly growth.53 Courts similarly uphold the denial of requests for
48. Id. at 351, 255 A.2d at 806.
49. Tenafly has what it considers to be a decaying central business core, choked by poor
parking and traffic facilities. We take judicial notice that this is a problem which today
faces many municipalities. Tenafly could have permitted the deterioration to continue
into blight, hoping that new and desirable retail business areas would develop elsewhere.
Instead, it appears that it wishes to make a strong effort to revitalize the present
area. ... We hold that it has the right to do so ....
Id at 351-52, 255 A.2d at 806-07.
50. Id
51. See, e.g., City of Tempe v. Rasor, 24 Ariz. App. 118, 536 P.2d 239 (1975); Ensign Bick-
ford Realty Corp. v. City Council of Livermore, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977);
Van Sicklen v. Browne, 15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1971); Green v. Hayward, 275 Or.
693, 552 P.2d 815 (1976); Duddles v. City Council of W. Lynn, 21 Or. App. 310, 535 P.2d 583
(1975); Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County v. Lerner, - Va. _ 267 S.E.2d 100 (1980). See
generally Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARy. L. REv. 1154 (1955);
Mandelker, The Role ofthe Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REv.
899 (1976). See also note 39 supra and accompanying text.
52. Compare Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council of Livermore, 68 Cal. App. 3d
467,477, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304, 310 (1977) with City of Tempe v. Rasor, 24 Ariz. App. 118, 123, 536
P.2d 239, 244 (1975).
53. Compare Carty v. Ojai, 77 Cal. App. 3d 329, 143 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1978) (rezoning to
prohibit construction of center valid because consistent with general plan) with Fallon v. Baker,
455 S.W.2d 572 (Ky. 1970) (ordinance permitting shopping center use void because rezoning was
in opposition to the comprehensive plan).
The Lexington, Kentucky plan at issue in Fallon had a regional shopping center policy designed
to protect city merchants. The classification for integrated shopping centers applied to applicants
requesting shopping center use regardless of previous classification of property. The ordinance
allowed the commission to consider the impact of the proposed center or surrounding land use
and the downtown business district. The plan recommended approval for new centers only when
their sales revenues would not decrease the business of existing shopping areas. Id.; Tarlock, Not
mi Accordance with a Comprehensive Plaa A Case Study of Regional Shopping Center Location
Conflicts in Lexington, Kentucky, 3 URB. L. ANN. 133, 138-61 (1970). See also State of Vermont
Environmental Commission #4 at 4-5. The new ordinance at issue in Fallon stated that the plan-
ning commission had not intended to decrease competition between shopping areas. See Tarlock,
supra, at 167-74. Neighborhood property owners had standing to claim they would be adversely
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rezoning to permit development of commercial centers when the goal
of this development is to stimulate growth in other areas. 4 The recent
trend toward regional and state land use planning allows communities
to protect existing commercial centers from competition." Land use
authorities can prevent development outside city boundaries that com-
petes with enterprises in the central business district 6 by increasing the
scope of comprehensive plans. 7
Several recent cases demonstrate judicial recognition of the plight of
the city center. 8 A vital central business district depends on suburban
retail customers.5 9 Downtown merchants cannot compete for this mar-
ket against convenient regional shopping malls without protectionist
zoning.60 Courts are predisposed to promote the concentration of com-
mercial development in urban centers to control population density
and avoid the expense of duplication of public services in the city and
affected by a shopping center in their residential neighborhood. Fallon v. Baker, 455 S.W.2d 572,
573 (Ky. 1970). Cf. Swain v. County of Winnebago, 111 111. App. 2d 458, 250 N.E.2d 439 (1969)
(downtown merchant has no standing to challenge rezoning for regional shopping center a sub-
stantial distance away). See generally cases cited in note 26 supra. The court declared the ordi-
nance void because there was no evidence to support the rezoning in opposition to the plan.
Fallon v. Baker, 455 S.W.2d 572, 574-75 (Ky. 1970).
54. Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304
(1977); Alachua County v. Reddick, 368 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Forte v. Borough of
Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super. 346, 255 A.2d 804 (1969); Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County v.
Lerner, - Va. - 267 S.E.2d 100 (1980).
55. Regional considerations support efforts to prevent outlying shopping centers by providing
an additional reason for denying development permission and by preventing development outside
city boundaries that adversely affects an established business district within the city. See, e.g.,
National Merritt, Inc. v. Weist, 41 N.Y.2d 438, 361 N.E.2d 1028, 393 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1977) (up-
holding ordinance limiting commercial development to neighborhood as opposed to regional cen-
ters); Save a Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978)
(invalidating rezoning for center because city could not act in disregard of effects outside city
limits).
56. See generally D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 16, at 1207-68.
57. See Willamette Univ. v. Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 45 Or. App. 355, 608
P.2d 1178 (1980) (state-wide planning goals to preserve farm land took precedence over city deci-
sion to convert land to urban use). See also Mindel v. Township Council of Franklin, 167 N.J.
Super. 461, 400 A.2d 1244 (1979).
58. See, e.g., Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980); Carty v.
Ojai, 77 Cal. App. 3d 329, 143 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1978); Second Norwalk Corp. v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 28 Conn. Supp. 426, 265 A.2d 332 (1969); Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super.
346, 255 A.2d 804 (1969); Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 22 Utah 2d 143,449 P.2d 989 (1969).
59. See Comment, The Shopping Center Radius Clause: Candidatefor Antitrust?, 32 Sw. L.J.
825, 825-26 (1978).
60. See Weaver & Duerksen, supra note 1, at 58-60.
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outlying areas.6' Courts recognize that the unimpeded flow of capital
to the suburbs will jeopardize city support for previously established
facilities and utilities.62
If a city articulates the public interest in the improvement of its
downtown area in a comprehensive zoning plan, the city should prevail
against a developer's appeal on the denial of a permit to build a new
center.63 A municipality can insulate itself from attack through a com-
prehensive plan of protectionist zoning which is premised on the tradi-
tional zoning concerns of traffic, fire hazards," aesthetics, 65  and
duplication of public facilities and services.66
II. DEVELOPERS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DENIAL OF A
COMPETITIVE USE UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
In the last three years, some developers have devised a new strategy
to combat a city's attempt to protect downtown commercial prosperity.
In addition to an improper zoning purpose claim under state law, 67 de-
velopers assert that the denial of a shopping center use violates the fed-
61. See Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977).
Affirming the denial of a rezoning to construct an auto dealership, the court stated:
In promoting the concentration of commercial development within existing urban areas,
the county is seeking to control population density, foster the free flow of traffic and
prevent congestion along a major artery, and avoid the costly consequences of spreading
county services too thin. Such policies, it is clear will often-times restrict the use of land
to uses other than "the highest and best use" dictated by the marketplace and will pre-
vent a landowner from using land for its most suitable use. But we cannot say that they
bear no rational relation to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the community.
Id at 513-14, 567 P.2d at 1264-65. See also Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County v. Lerner,
- Va. .- , 267 S.E.2d 100 (1980).
62. Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980); City of St. Paul v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969); Fallon v.
Baker, 455 S.W.2d 572 (Ky. 1970); Duddles v. City Council of W. Lynn, 21 Or. App. 310, 535 P.2d
583 (1975).
63. Many states mandate planning by local governments and demand zoning be consistent
with the comprehensive plan. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.33.070, .085, .090 (1980); CAL. Gov.
CODE § 65300 (Deering 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 6807(a), 6904 (1974); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 225-21 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6508, 6511 (1980); VA. CODE §§ 15.1-427, -446.1 (Supp.
1979). Some states do not require a comprehensive plan, but instead rule that zoning must be in
accordance with any plan that is adopted. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-462.01(E) (1977); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4962(l)(A) (1978). See generally Mandelker, supra note 51, at 956-65.
64. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 38, 62 supra and accompanying text.
67. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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eral antitrust laws.68 Plaintiff developers prefer the antitrust claim
because it allows treble damages, attorney's fees, a federal forum,6 9 and
a potentially favorable body of substantive law.7" Developers have fre-
quently filed their antitrust complaints under the Sherman Act.7
A. Restraints of Trade Under the Sherman Act
Section I of the Sherman Act condemns associations that restrain
interstate commerce in the United States. 72 The Supreme Court has
interpreted section 1 to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade.73
In order to determine whether an association unreasonably restrains
trade, courts apply either a per se rule or rule of reason analysis. 74 The
per se rule invalidates trade agreements which impose such a detrimen-
tal effect on competition that an extended investigation of the business
excuse for the association is unnecessary.75 Plaintiffs invariably tri-
umph if the court classifies the challenged activity as a per se viola-
tion.76 Under rule of reason analysis, courts carefully examine the
68. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. See also State of Vermont District Environ-
ment Commission #4. Pyramid Mall developers contend the denial of the permit under the state
land use act amounts to a conspiracy under section I of the Sherman Act.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
70. Bosselman, Does the Lafayette Case Bring Zoning Under the Antitrust Laws, 31 LAND
Usn DIG. 4 (1979).
71. Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980); Mason City Center
Assocs. v. Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979); General Growth Properties v. Sioux
City, No. 91992 (D. Iowa Feb. 12, 1975); In re Pyramid Co. of Burlington, No. 559-78CNM
(Chittenden Sup. Ct. (Vt.) April 21, 1980).
72. Section 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corpo-
ration, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
73. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
74. See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 153 (1977).
75. The Supreme Court announced the standard to determine activities that are per se illegal
in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
76. Conduct found to be per se illegal includes: (1) Agreements among competitors to fix
prices, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); (2) group boycotts, Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
357 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); (3) tying arrangements,
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Northern Pacific Ry. v.
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industry involved to determine whether the agreement promotes or
suppresses competition." Defendants succeed more readily in the rule
of reason case because the court will consider alternatives available to
the city under the circumstances.78
Section 2 of the Act prohibits monopolizing,79 focusing on single
firm conduct designed to achieve or maintain monopoly power in a
market."0 The primary issue under the statute is the share of the mar-
ket controlled by the defendant.8'
B. The Developers' Complaint
A zoning authority cannot control or monopolize a market by it-
self.8 2 Thus, developers label the denial of a shopping center use as an
illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. 83 The typical complaint alleges a conspiracy between mem-
bers of the zoning commission and the downtown merchants or
developers to exclude the suburban regional center.84 The zoning com-
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); (4) Agreements among competitors to divide markets, United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
77. See National Soe'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Chi-
cago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246.U.S. 231 (1918).
78. See E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND EcONoMics 219-27 (1976).
79. Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if
a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
80. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
81. Courts ascertain market share by investigating defendant's control over both the product
and the geographic markets. The relevant product market includes all goods or services that have
a high degree of functional interchangeability. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
The relevant geographic market consists of the area in which suppliers of the good operate and
where buyers naturally turn to acquire the product. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384
U.S. 546 (1966); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
82. See note 79 supra.
83. See note 72 supra.
84. In Mason City Center Assocs. v. Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), the
court said:
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges the following specifically relevant facts. Holmen and Er-
icson [merchant defendants] have entered into an agreement with the city to organize
and plan the Downtown Center upon the express condition that the City prevent any
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mission claims that the state action exemption protects it from applica-
tion of the Sherman Act. 5 The merchant defendants may demur
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which shields private attempts to
influence governmental bodies from antitrust scrutiny.86  The court
may deny the parties' motions to dismiss in order to consider whether
the zoning commission waived the state action exemption by conspiring
with private merchants to restrain trade87 and whether the Noerr-Pen-
ningon doctrine does not apply to governmental activities of a proprie-
tary nature. 8
person or firm from planning or constructing a regional shopping center that would com-
pete with the Downtown Center.
Id at 740. See also Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980); Scott v.
Sioux City, No. 79-4009 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 26, 1979).
85. Under the general state action exemption, the antitrust laws do not apply to otherwise
valid governmental action that results in a restraint of trade or monopoly. See Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943); notes 91-97 infra and accompanying text.
86. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a corollary of the governmental immunity from the
antitrust laws. The doctrine protects private citizens who induce the government to take lawful
actions. Compare Eastern R.Rs. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
172 (1961) (Railroads, through their trade association and agents, conducted a deceptive publica-
tion plan to encourage laws restricting competition from truckers. The court held the conspiracy,
intended only to influence official action, did not violate the Sherman Act.) with UMW v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (Union and large employers agreed to eliminate small coal compa-
nies by inducing the Secretary of Labor to establish high minimum wages for employers of TVA
suppliers. The Court declared the challenged act itself legal and not part of a larger concerted
effort violative of the Sherman Act.).
The doctrine protects private citizens who induce the government to take lawful action. As long
as the efforts of the citizens are genuine, the immunity applies, even if the municipal activities
result in an elimination of competition. Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d
220, 227-28 (7th Cir. 1975). But see California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508 (1972) (conspiracy to clog process of state agency by producing sham claims not exempt
under the Noerr rule); Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.
1969) (bribery not exempt under Noerr). Compare Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Coddy, 615 F.2d 830
(9th Cir. 1980) (complaint by successful developer stated a claim under sham exception to Noerr-
Pennington doctrine in view of the fact that unsuccessful developer filed 13 baseless lawsuits) and
Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (allegations that
shopping center developers financed suits by nearby property owners to amend zoning ordinance
did not prevent Noerr-Pennington immunity), afd, 578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
983 (1978), with Bracken's Shopping Center, Inc. v. Ruve, 273 F. Supp. 606 (S.D. Ill. 1967) (down-
town merchant's suit to change ordinance to prevent construction of suburban center protected
under Noerr-Pennington regardless of motivation).
87. Mason City Center Assocs. v. Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 745-46 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
In Scott v. Sioux City, No. 79-4009 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 26, 1979), plaintiff's allegation of conspir-
acy in restraint of trade was sufficient to allege that the denial of the variance by the city council
was an invalid or illegal governmental action falling outside Parker and Noerr-Pennington immu-
nity. See Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964).
88. See note 87 supra. See also Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th
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C. The State Action Exemption
The developer cannot file suit against the zoning commission and
private merchants without encountering the state action exemption. 9
Until recently, the exemption protected states and their officers and
agents, including municipalities, from antitrust prosecution.9" The
state action exemption originated in Parker v. Brown,9 in which the
Supreme Court observed that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act
to restrain the anticompetitive activities of a state and its officers.92 In
Parker an agricultural association challenged California's raisin mar-
keting program which was designed to maintain high prices. 93 The
Court admitted that the project, if instituted by private citizens, would
constitute an illegal restraint of trade.94 The program, however, was
beyond the scope of the Sherman Act because California undertook the
marketing scheme in its sovereign capacity95 rather than as an attempt
Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992, opinion reinstated, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978);
Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975); Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d
272 (D.C. Cir. 1972); George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); E.W. Wiggins Airways v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362
F.2d 52 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation,
[1979-21 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 62746 (N.D. Cal.); Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs.,
Inc., [1979-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62744 (M.D.N.C.); Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
89. Law review articles dealing generally with the Parker exception include: Donnem, Fed-
eralAntitrust Law VersusAnticompetitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRusT L.J. 950 (1970);
Jacobs, State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 221, (1975);
Posner, The Proper Relationshp Between State Regulation and Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 693 (1974).
90. At least one student author assumes that the lack of antitrust actions against municipali-
ties is the result of the Parker doctrine. See Note, The Antitrust Liability of Municipality Under the
Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REv. 368, 379 n.68 (1977). But see Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (municipality is a person for Sherman Act pur-
poses).
91. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
92. Id
93. Id at 341, 346. In addition to the antitrust attack on the California Agricultural Prorate
Act, the private raisin producer alleged that the statute was invalid under the 1937 Federal Agri-
cultural Marketing Agreement Act and the commerce clause. Id at 344. The Court found that
the California Act did not conflict with the federal statute. Id at 354. The Court also realized
that the raisin industry was a local concern under state regulation absent preemptive federal legis-
lation. Id at 360-61, 368.
94. Id at 350.
95. "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that




to further a proprietary interest.96
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions severely restricted the Parker
state action exemption.97 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar98 a Virginia
couple accused the state bar association of price fixing by requiring a
minimum fee schedule.99 The Virginia legislature had delegated au-
thority to the state supreme court to regulate the legal profession)°°
The state court acknowledged the state bar as an administrative
agency,'' but did not rule on the minimum fee issue.102 Because the
challenged activity was not "required by the state acting as sover-
eign," 10 3 the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the state bar
was not exempt from liability under the antitrust laws."°
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. 105 the Court refused to apply Parker
immunity to private action not compelled by state law." 6 An electric
utility, on its own initiative, instituted a program that allowed custom-
96. The state created and enforced the private raisin program in execution of a governmental
policy. Id at 352. The Court suggested that the state could not immunize private action by au-
thorizing it. Id, at 351-52. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386-
87 (1951) (Louisiana statute that enforced private price-fixing agreement invalid); Northern Secs.
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 344-47 (1904) (state's liberal incorporation statute does not
exempt corporation's conspiracy to restrain competition in railways).
97. See generally HandlerAntitrut-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363 (1978); Handler, Chang-
ing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L.
REv. 979, 1006-16 (1977); Teply, Antitrust Immunity of State and Local Government Action, 48
TUL. L. REv. 272 (1974); Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited" The State Action Doctrine After Gold-
farb, Cantor and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 898 (1977).
98. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
99. Id at 775. Virginia state law required house puchasers to produce title insurance issued
after a title examination by a member of the state bar. Plaintiffs instituted the class action price
fixing suit because no lawyer would perform the service for less than the minimum rate under the
schedule. Id at 775-76, 778.
100. Id at 790.
101. Id at 791.
102. The state bar had joined in the private anticompetitive activity of the county bar by
imposing sanctions for deviations from the rate schedule. Id at 790-91. The Supreme Court of
Virginia, however, had not requested the state bar to produce a schedule or demanded its enforce-
ment. Id at 790.
103. Id at 790. The Court interpreted Parker as exempting all regulations mandated by the
state. "The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the
type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the state
action as sovereign." Id The Virginia Supreme Court stated that it was permissible for lawyers
to consider the state bar's fee schedule. The court further directed lawyers to avoid setting all
changes according to the schedule. Id at 788-89, 789 n.19.
104. Id at 791.
105. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
106. Id at 598.
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ers to exchange used light bulbs for new ones without a separate
charge.'0 7 A druggist protested that the electric company's use of its
protective monopoly restrained competition in the sale of light bulbs.0 8
Defendant utility company claimed a state action exemption because of
the state commission's approval of the bulb exchange program in its
general tariff'0 9 The Court assumed the commission was neutral on
the question of the bulb exchange because the program was not essen-
tial to the tariff or the operation of the utility."l0 The Court explained
that state regulation of a private enterprise evokes an implied exemp-
tion only if the regulation is necessary to effectuate the regulatory sys-
tem."' The Supreme Court again denied the applicability of the
exemption. 1 2
A majority of the Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona"3 articu-
lated a standard that simplified the conflicting interpretations of
107. Detroit Edison operated the light bulb exchange program before the creation of the
Michigan Public Service Commission. Id at 583.
108. Because no other retailer could include the cost of light bulbs in the rates for electric
service, the utility was operating with an unfair advantage. Plaintiff presented evidence that de-
fendant supplied over fifty percent of the light bulb market. Id at 581-82. Plaintiff, in effect,
charged defendant utility company with operating a tying agreement, refusing to sell electric serv-
ice without including the cost of light bulbs in the charge. The Supreme Court initially prohibited
tie-in arrangements when the owner of a patent conditioned the sale of the patented goods on the
purchase of a second unpatented product. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Motion
Pictures Pats. Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224
U.S. 1 (1912). Eventually the Supreme Court found that tying practices violate the Sherman Act
if defendant has substantial market power in the tying product and a substantial volume of com-
merce in the tied product. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953). Tying is a per se antitrust offense. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392 (1947). See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 74, at 431-71; Posner, Exclusionary Practices
and the Aniitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 506 (1974); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50 (1958).
109. [W]hile the existing tariff remains in effect, respondent may not abandon the pro-
gram without violating a Commission order, and therefore, without violating state law.
It has, therefore, been permitted by the Commission to carry out the program, and also is
required to do so until an appropriate filing has been made and has received the ap-
proval of the Commission.
428 U.S. at 585.
110. The fact that other utilities did not have similar programs was evidence that the "exemp-
tion was not necessary in order to make the regulatory act work." Id at 584-85, 597.
111. Id at 597.
112. The Court found "no logical inconsistency betwen requiring such a firm to meet regula-
tory criteria insofar as it is exercising its natural monopoly powers and also to comply with anti-
trust standards to the extent that it engages in business activity in competitive areas of the
economy." Id at 596.
113. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Appellants, licensed attorneys and members of the Arizona state
bar, charged that the disciplinary rule, which prohibits attorneys from advertising, violates the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/5
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Parker, Goldfarb, and Cantor. The state action exemption depends on
the degree of the state's independent regulatory interest in the chal-
lenged activity." 4 The Court immunized the Arizona state bar from
antitrust attack for its regulation of attorneys' advertising according to
a disciplinary rule of the Arizona Supreme Court." 5 The Court dis-
tinguished Goldfarb because the restraint in Bates was an affirmative
command of the state supreme court which was promulgated in accord-
ance with a longstanding regulatory system." 6 Cantor did not control
the outcome because the public entity in Bates was under continuous
supervision by the state.' '7
The Supreme Court first applied the antitrust laws to a municipality
in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co. 118 Municipally-
owned power companies sued a privately-owned competitor for anti-
trust violations." 9 The defendant brought a counterclaim against the
city under the Sherman Act alleging illegal attempts to delay the con-
struction of the private utility's nuclear power plant.' 20 A sharply di-
Sherman Act because it tends to limit competition. The state bar had served the lawyers with a
complaint because they advertized legal fees for particular services. Id at 353-56.
114. Justice Blackmun, writing the opinion for the Court, stated that the state's interest in
Bates "in regulating the activities of the bar is at the core of the State's power to protect the
public." Id at 361. The state's interest is so high because of its governmental function of ad-
ministering justice. Id at 361-62. Justice Blackmun emhasized that the state had a long standing
habit of controlling solicitation and advertising by attorneys. Id at 362.
115. The challenged restraint in Bates derived from Arizona Supreme Court Rules 27(a) and
29(a) and Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B).
116. The Supreme Court Rules in Goldfarb did not mandate the price fixing conspiracy. 421
U.S. 773, 790 (1975). See note 109 supra and accompanying text. In contrast, Rule 29(a) of the
Supreme Court of Arizona provides: "The duties and obligations of members of the bar shall be
as prescribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, effec-
tive November 1, 1970, as amended by this Court." ARM. REv. STAT. ANN., Rule 29(a) (Supp.
1980), citedin Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 n.12 (1977).
117. The Court emphasized that the decision in Cantor would have been different if the claim
had been against a public official or agency instead of a private company. 433 U.S. at 361. See
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585-92, 600-01 (1976). In Bates, the Arizona Supreme
Court "is the real party in interest; it adopted the rules, and it is the ultimate trier of fact and law
in the enforcement process." 433 U.S. at 361.
118. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
119. Lafayette alleged the private utility company violated Sherman Act sections 1 and 2 by
preventing operation of competing utilities, refusing to wheel power, foreclosing supplies from
defendant's markets, and instituting sham litigation to prevent financing for petitioner's electric
generation facilities. Id at 392 n.5.
120. The counterclaim alleged that the city engaged in sham litigation to prevent competition
from the nuclear electric power-generating plant and to displace the private utility within munici-
pal boundaries. Municipalities are authorized to own and operate utilities under LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 33:1326, :4162, :4163 (West 1966). In the city of Lafayette, the municipal utilities had a
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vided court affirmed the denial of the municipality's motion to dismiss
the counterclaim under the Parker doctrine. 12  A five justice majority
agreed122 that a municipality is a person for the purposes of the Sher-
man Act.' 23 A plurality of the Court recognized an exemption for an-
ticompetitive municipal conduct.' 24 The plurality determined whether
the exemption applies from "the authority given a governmental entity
to operate in a particular area that the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of.' 25  The exception would protect only
municipal activity that state policy requires or directs to displace com-
petition.126
Chief Justice Burger joined the majority holding that municipalities
are subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws.' 27 Chief Justice Burger,
virtual monopoly over city service and competed with defendant private utility over the suburban
market. 435 U.S. at 392 n.6.
121. Id at 394.
122. Justice Brennan announced the opinion of the Court with respect to part I. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined. Justice Marshall filed a concurring
opinion.
123. 435 U.S. at 395. Compare Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203
U.S. 390 (1906) (municipality is a "person" for purposes of section 8 of the Sherman Act, the
definitional section), with Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942) ("any person" in section 7 of the
Sherman Act includes states). But see Note, supra note 13, (recent court decisions indicate cities
are gaining independent standing and power). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575
(1964).
124. See generally Cutin, Antitrust Comes to the Cities-Analysis of City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co. and its Effect on Municipal Antitrust Liability, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 7
(1980); Note, The Application ofAntitrust Laws to Municipal Activities, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 518
(1979); Note, supra note 13; Note, City of Lafayette, Louisiana v. Louisiana Power & Light Co."
Will MunicipalAntitrust Liability Doom Effective State-Local Government Relations?, 36 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 129 (1979); 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 165 (1978); 28 KAN. L. REV. 166 (1980).
125. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 394 (1978). The
Supreme Court approved the standard suggested by the court of appeals:
[W]hether the state legislature contemplated a certain type of anticompetitive restraint
... it will suffice if the challenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent.
Thus, a trial judge may ascertain, from the authority given a governmental entity to
operate in a particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action com-
plained of.
Id. at 393-94 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
126. The Court rejected the idea that political processes can safeguard the public against an-
ticompetitive behavior by a municipality. "If municipalities were free to make economic choices
counseled solely by their own anticompetitive effects, a serious chink in the armour of antitrust
protection would be introduced at odds with the comprehensive national policy Congress estab-
lished." City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978).
127. See note 122 supra.
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however, agreed with the dissent 128 that only governmental activities
should entitle municipalities to the state action exemption. 129  Chief
Justice Burger's concurrence focused on the langauge from Parker that
granted immunity for governmental, as opposed to proprietary, func-
tions of a municipality. 3 ' He defined a protected governmental activ-
ity as an "integral operation in the area of traditional government
functions,"'' thus presenting the connection between the state action
exemption and principles of federalism.'3 2 The Chief Justice denied
the city of Lafayette immunity from liability in its capacity as a utility
operator 33 because the municipality's interest in preventing legitimate
competition was not essential to the federal system. 3 4
128. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices White and Rehnquist joined.
Justice Blackmun joined in all but part IIB. The dissent applied a blanket state action exemption
to all governmental bodies. 435 U.S. at 426. The dissent predicted that municipal governments
could not fulfill their function under the threat of antitrust liabilty.
[A] prudent municipality will probably believe itself compelled to seek passage of a state
statute requiring it to engage in any activity which might be considered anticompetitive.
Each time a city grants an exclusive franchise, or chooses to provide a service itself on a
monopoly basis, or refuses to grant a zoning variance to a business . . . state legislative
action will be necessary to ensure that a federal court will not subsequently decide that
the activity was not contemplated by the legislature.
Id at 438 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
129. Id at 422-24.
130. Chief Justice Burger interpreted Parker as firmly rooted in the principles of federalism,
allowing a state action exemption to preserve the dual system of government. Id at 421. The
Chief Justice suggested state action analysis should evolve parallel to the development of concepts
of federalism. Id at 421 n.2. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). "In a dual system of
government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." Id at 351.
131. Chief Justice Burger designated municipal functions that should be immune from the
antitrust laws through a phrase borrowed from National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
852 (1976). It is difficult to predict which functions fulfill the definition. A nonexhaustive list in
National League included fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks
and recreation. Id at 851.
132. Chief Justice Burger's opinion implied that even Congress could not subject traditional
governmental functions to antitrust challenge. 435 U.S. at 423. See National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976):
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to
every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress
may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner. ...
Id at 845.
133. 435 U.S. at 425.
134. Id at 425-26.
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D. State Action Exemption After Lafayette
The decision in Lafayette encourages private antitrust suits against
municipalities.'35 Plaintiffs assert that municipal decisions that grant a
competitive advantage to one economic unit over another substantiate
an antitrust cause of action. 136 A series of recent federal district court
opinions denies immunity to municipal defendants from claims that
arise from their participation in business.'37 The nonexempt activities
include: Entering into exclusive procurement contracts 38 and operat-
ing public utilities,'39 hospitals, 4 0 airports, ' 4' and parks. 42 The district
courts, however, continue to withdraw other municipal activities from
antitrust scrutiny.'43 The Sherman Act does not preempt some exer-
135. See Rose, Municipal Antitrust Liability After City of Lafayette (unpublished paper
presented at NIMLO Conference on "Municipalities and Antitrust Ligitation").
136. One commentator explains that as municipalities engage in more business and regulatory
activity, the likelihood that a private party will be economically injured increases. Id at 3-5.
137. See Jordan v. Mills, [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62704 (E.D. Mich.) (price-fixing suit
brought against operation of single store in state prison barred by state action exemption because
regulation of prison traditional governmental function).
138. See, e.g., Duke & Co., Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975) (municipality
not exempt from Sherman Act section 1 suit for refusing to sell plaintiffs malt products on conces-
sion stands); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62746
(N.D. Cal.) (municipality not immune from charge of conspiracy to grant a monopoly in airport
rental cars); Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (no
exemption for ordinance awarding exclusive contract to cab company for pick-up service from
airport).
139. See Almeda Mall v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61485
(S.D. Tex.) (city regulated utility not exempt from antitrust scrutiny for refusing to sell shopping
center single-metered power). But see Shrader v. Hurton, 471 F. Supp. 1236, 1242 (W.D. Va.
1979), aj7'd, 626 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1980) (ordinance requiring connection to public water system
exempt because of government act to provide water).
140. See City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977) (reversed grant of
summary judgment for city that had acquired a private hospital and leased it to a county non-
profit organization). But see Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) (local requirement of certificate of need for hospital permit immune because author-
ized under state policy to restrict entry of new health care facilities).
141. See Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs., Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 162744
(M.D.N.C.) (county board of commissioners not immune from charges of conspiracy to prevent
airline from becoming fixed lease operator at local airport).
142. See Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977) (park district
subject to suit for price fixing at pro shops operated on municipal golf course), vacated and re-
,nanded, 435 U.S. 992, opinion reinstated, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978).
143. See Cedar-Riverside Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn. 1978)
(city housing development immune because granted monopoly under state law), aff'd, 606 F.2d
254 (8th Cir. 1979). See also Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 719-
20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978) (advisory committee on New Jersey ethics immune
for prohibition of advertising in phone book); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency,
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cises of police power that traditionally cause an anticompetitive ef-
fect. 144
The district courts have not developed a uniform rule on municipal
liability for the anticompetitive effect of land use decisions. One court
avoided the immunity issue because the zoning denial was a noncom-
mercial act outside the purview of the antitrust laws. 145  Since Lafay-
ette, once a complaint fulfills jurisdictional requirements under the
Sherman Act, municipal liability depends on a finding that the state
activity compelled displacement of competition. 146
E. State Action Exemption and Denial of Competitive Use
in Bad Faith
The district courts consistently deny immunity for zoning practices
that result from municipal participation in an anticompetitive conspir-
acy between private parties. 47 An ordinance that benefits a particular
business in a geographic market improperly denies a use. 1 48 An ordi-
nance is an invalid exercise of the police power, and is unauthorized by
state enabling statutes, if it does not advance the general welfare. 149 In
addition, a municipal zoning authority violates federal antitrust laws
under the Lafayette rule if the state does not mandate the ordinance
under a valid regulatory policy.'5 A developer of an outlying shop-
433 F.2d 131, 137 (8th Cir. 1970) (city monopoly of public transportation exempt under legislative
authorization); E.W. Wiggins Airways v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966) (defendant immune for conspiracy to establish exclusive fixed base
operation at airport because agent of the state).
144. See Jordan v. Mills, [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62704 (E.D. Mich.) (prison store price-
fixing suit barred by state action doctrine because regulation of prisons traditional governmental
function); Gibson Distrib. Co. v. Downtown Dev. Ass'n, [1978-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62143
(Tex.) (Sunday closing laws not preempted by the Sherman Act).
145. Miller & Son Paving Co. v. Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 1268, 1272
(E.D. Pa. 1978), aftd, 595 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
146. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980).
147. See Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), aff'd
on rehearingper curiam, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); Mason
City Center Assocs. v. Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979); Scott v. Sioux City, No.
79-4009 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 26, 1979).
148. See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
149. See notes 12-19 supra and accompanying text.
150. A municipality authorized to zone under an enabling act is liable because the state did
not explicitly delegate power to benefit individuals. See note 16 supra. A municipality operating
under home rule may exercise powers indispensable to the functioning of local government.
These powers do not include participating in a conspiracy for private profit. See City of Denton v.
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ping center must, therefore, allege that the zoning authority's concerted
efforts to restrain trade by enacting use restrictions involved private
parties.' 5
Before denying the state action exemption, courts require confirma-
tion of the alleged conspiracy. 152 Unless the developer has proof of an
actual agreement between the defendants, he must use circumstantial
evidence to advance a conspiracy claim.'53 Courts allow the inference
of conspiracy from parallel behavior only under compelling circum-
stances.' 54 Factors that support the likelihood of joint agreement be-
tween officials and private parties include the opportunity for illicit
transactions' 55 and a motive for entering the anticompetitive conspir-
acy.' 5
6
The plaintiff in Whitworth v. Perkins' charged the city officials and
residents of Impact, Texas with conspiracy to restrain trade in alcoholic
beverages. Plaintiff claimed that the zoning ordinance prohibiting the
sale of liquor on residential lots purposely created an "oasis in a dry
city."' 58 The court focused on two primary considerations: the per-
sonal interests of government decisionmakers and whether the ordi-
nance advanced those interests. 59
Denton Home Ice Co., 119 Tex. 193, 27 S.W.2d 119 (1930). See generally sources cited in note 15
supra.
151. See Rose, supra note 137, at 4.
152. See, e.g., Mason City Center Assocs. v. Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 744 (N.D. Iowa
1979); Scott v. Sioux City, No. 79-4009 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 26, 1979).
153. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 74, at 313-19; ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS 34-37 (1975).
154. See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954)
(consciously parallel actions do not compel finding of agreement); Pevely Dairy Co. v. United
States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950) (reversed finding of conspir-
acy to fix prices because of evidence that same prices were inevitable). The compelling circum-
stances are sometimes labeled "plus factors." Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American
Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 205-06 n.19 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962); C-O Two
Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
155. Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 548-50 (5th Cir.
1978), rehearing denied, 591 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). But see Sun
Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969).
156. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
157. 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992, af'd on rehearing per curiam, 576
F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979).
158. Id at 380.
159. The court remanded for more evidence on "the number of acres in Impact which are
zoned for commercial use, who owns such land, the relationship of these zones to each other, and
the past and present status of the parcel of land owned by the plaintiff. ... Id at 382.
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F. State 4ction Exemption and Denial of Competitive Use
in Good Faith
The district courts have not found a municipality liable under the
antitrust laws for refusing to rezone for a regional shopping center in
order to preserve the financial security of the downtown business dis-
trict.1 60 The plurality in Lafayette treats zoning intended to grant a
competitive advantage the same as it treats a good faith zoning decision
that is valid under state law.' 6 ' By delegating the power to zone, the
state does not explicitly mandate specific ordinances or advocate a pol-
icy to displace competition for any reason in the land use field.1
62
Thus, if courts adopt the Lafayette plurality view, a municipality may
be liable for denying a shopping center use as a misuse of discretion.
63
A state can protect against Lafayette liability by specifically an-
nouncing in the body of an enabling act that the public interest in pre-
serving the downtown area has priority over the private interest in
building additional outlying shopping centers.'" A declaration by the
state that there shall be no antitrust consequences to zoning regulations
is insufficient to shield cities from developers' suits.' 65 A majority of
the Supreme Court would remove from Sherman Act scrutiny all zon-
ing decisions that perform "integral governmental function[s]."1 66 The
Court has not, however, provided criteria to determine whether partic-
ular local land use determinations fall within the exempted category.
Finally, most scholars in the land use field do not consider zoning es-
sential to the survival of a city's commercial district.' 67 In practice,
however, most cities and many counties use zoning to plan for future
160. See cases cited in note 2 supra. Two courts, however, have called for additional investi-
gation into the motives behind denials of outlying competitive uses. See Mason City Center As-
socs. v. Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979); Scott v. Sioux City, No. 79-4009 (N.D.
Iowa Feb. 26, 1979).
161. See notes 30-57 supra and accompanying text.
162. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
163. See Nelson v. Utah County, [1978-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62128 (D. Utah 1977) (zoning
enabling legislation giving the power to zone and adopt a master plan does not require the activ-
ity; therefore zoning is discretionary).
164. See note 134 supra (Justice Stewart's dissent in Lafayette).
165. See Star Lines, Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Ship. Auth., 451 F. Supp. 157, 162, 166-68
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (state law that stated, ITrMhe Antitrust Laws shall not be applicable to any action
of the defendant taken pursuant to the provisions hereof," did not attempt anticompetitive activi-
ties).
166. See notes 135-38 supra and accompanying text.
167. See E. BAssni-r, supra note 13, at 13.
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growth. 168 Thus, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court's formula
will immunize zoning that attempts to preserve the central business dis-
trict.
III. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR DENIAL OF COMPETITIVE USE
If the plurality view in Lafayette prevails in subsequent decisions,
developers will litigate all shopping center use restrictions under the
Sherman Act. The decision to deny a use is not one of the enumerated
activities that constitutes a per se offense.1 69 Therefore, the courts will
consider the use denial under the rule of reason analysis. 170
A. Conflict Between The Sherman Act and State Zoning Laws
Both state zoning and federal antitrust laws invalidate an ordinance
that prohibits a shopping center use for the purpose of benefiting estab-
lished businesses. A conflict arises only when section 1 of the Sherman
Act voids a local regulation enacted for a legitimate purpose under the
state's police power. In the field of constitutional law, courts deal with
inconsistencies between state and federal laws under the doctrine of
preemption. 71 Whether local zoning laws unduly burden areas of fed-
168. See I R. ANDERSON, supra note 11, § 7.27; 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW
§ 18.03 (1974).
169. The agreement is not a horizontal restraint of trade, which implicates competitors on the
same market level. A horizontal market division would be per se invalid. See United States v.
Topco Assocs., 405 U.S 596, 608 (1972); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593, 598 (1951); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 241-43 (1899); United
States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 574 (2d Cir. 1961).
Neither does the agreement involve a vertical arrangement to divide territories between custom-
ers and suppliers. Vertical territorial restraints are subject to rule of reason analysis. See Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
One commentator suggests that the city's powers are analogous to those of a seller of a unique
product, including the ability to allocate vertically territories and enforce a horizontal allocation
among distributors. See Dabney, supra note 37, at 469.
In the case of a good faith denial of a shopping center use, the zoning authority does not give
effect to a private horizontal territorial agreement. Therefore, the rule of reason would apply to
the vertical market allocation scheme under the Lafayette plurality's approach.
170. See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
171. State action in direct conflict with federal legislation is generally void. The supremacy
clause states:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land-, and the judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. Co sT. art. VI, cl. 2. The preemption issue usually arises when state power is dismissed
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eral regulation depends on the existence of less restrictive alternatives
available to the local authority.
72
Courts can examine preemption concerns in antitrust zoning suits by
permitting the municipality to raise a public interest defense.' 73 This
defense would safeguard legitimate municipal activities, such as protec-
tive zoning schemes, that are not expressly contemplated by the state in
the enabling legislation. In order to raise this defense successfully, the
zoning commission must assert a valid purpose for enacting the ordi-
nance,' 74 demonstrate that the denial of the shopping center use does
not have an unreasonable anticompetitive effect, 75 and show that the
use denial furthers the governmental purpose initially asserted by the
commission. 17
6
The first element requires the zoning commission to explain the rea-
son for the denial of the shopping center variance. The defendant must
because of implications from federal domination of a field of regulation. The federal antitrust
laws would directly oppose many state and local regulations but for the state action exemption.
The Supreme Court devised that doctrine to preserve the federal system. See notes 130-32 supra
and accompanying text. Lafayette omits unauthorized municipal activities from the state action
exemption, displacing the authority of independent local activity. See notes 124-25 supra; note
137 upra and accompanying text. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 267-70 (1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-401 (1978).
172. The Supreme Court has applied the standard to determine whether state regulations are
valid under the commerce clause. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333, 354 (1977) (state requirement that closed containers of apples be labeled only by United
States standards invalid because nondiscriminatory alternatives were available); Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrel, 424 U.S. 366, 376-77 (1976) (state cannot condition the right to sell out-
of-state milk on other state's reciprocal agreement to sell milk because other, simpler restrictions
can maintain quality of milk); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951)
(ordinance prohibiting sale of milk produced more than five miles away void because city could
inspect producers to ensure quality of milk); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) (public
health purpose of state requirement that livestock be inspected in state immediately before slaugh-
ter better served by inspection elsewhere).
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), applied the standard in the text by permit-
ting an exemption only to the extent necessary to make the regulatory system work. See notes
110-11 upra and accompanying text.
173. The public interest in a local regulatory scheme is not raised in the context of rule of
reason analysis. See generally Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to Municipal Activities,
supra note 124.
174. This element parallels the requirement for a valid ordinance under state law. Defendant
zoning commission should articulate the public benefits accomplished by the regulation.
175. This element of the defense parallels the concerns of Cantor and preemption analysis
under the commerce clause. See note 172 supra.
176. This element requires the rational relation test usually required by the Court for local
regulation of business. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 501 F.2d 706, 710 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
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establish the following sequence of events that would take place but for
the regulation: Outlying development will draw vital business away
from the downtown center; the movement will impair land values and
the property tax base; and the city will be unable to find essential serv-
ices for the public welfare.'77
Under the second element of the defense, the municipality must
show that the use denial does not unreasonably affect competition be-
cause viable commercial alternatives exist for the shopping center de-
veloper.178 To support this contention the zoning commission could
suggest a possible location for the shopping center in the central busi-
ness district or in another outlying area already zoned for commercial
use. Absent proof of an alternate site, the city's defense fails because
an absolute ban on growth in the area is impermissible.1
79
In the third element of the public interest defense, the zoning com-
mission must exhibit how the allegedly anticompetitive ordinance pro-
motes the continued vitality of the downtown commercial area. The
zoning commission may introduce evidence that the amount of goods
sold in the central business district either remained constant or de-
creased less than it would have without the use restriction. The com-
mission should link these figures to the stability of the property tax base
and the city's capacity to maintain its level of governmental services. 80
177. See State of Vermont District Environmental Commission #4 at 4-5 (findings on eco-
nomic impact).
178. See notes 172, 175 supra.
179. See Pascock Ass'n v. Mayor of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977); Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 NJ. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
808 (1975).
180. See exhibits of Burlington presented to the Vermont Environmental Commission:
We find that the development as proposed will place an unreasonable burden on the
ability of the City of Burlington to provide municipal and governmental services, but
will not place an unreasonable burden on the ability of the Town of Williston or other
local governments to provide such services. Our findings are supported by the following:
1) The transfer of retail sales to the mall would result in a decrease in the appraised
value of commercial properties in Burlington that would, without an increase in the
City's tax rate, reduce potential revenues by $450,000 to $600,000 per year after adjust-
ment for increased state aid to education attributable to a reduced tax base.
2) Demand for governmental services provided by the City of Burlington would not
decrease as a result of the construction and operation of the mall.
3) The City of Burlington is operating at a staffing level approximately 15% below
that of other no-growth cities of similar size in the Northeast.
4) City departments are operating at levels which cannot absorb reductions in fund-
ing without reducing levels of service, for example:
(a) The Burlington Fire Department mans its equipment at personnel levels




Lafayette increases the likelihood of a successful antitrust suit by a
developer against the zoning authority that denied a competitive use.
Lafayette augments state rules against improper zoning because the de-
cision exposes allegedly anticompetitive use denials to antitrust scru-
tiny. Municipal liability for unauthorized activities, however, also
threatens attempts to plan future land use. Without considering the
public interest, Lafayette subordinates the state action exemption and
local freedom of action to the federal policy of free competition.
The public interest defense recognizes preservation of a downtown
district as a valid local concern. The defense, however, does not advo-
cate the Parker application of total immunity for all governmental ac-
tions. Defendant zoning commissions have the burden of proving that
an anticompetitive policy does not underlie the prohibition of outlying
development. Thus, the defense considers the countervailing interests
of modem commercial development and the economic survival of es-
tablished business districts.
Carol Robin Stone
sonnel to provide regular fire inspection and prevention services. As a result, prop-
erty owners in the City of Burlington pay for fire insurance at higher rates than
would otherwise be the case.
(b) The Police Department does not have sufficient personnel to maintain what
it feels are satisfactory levels of foot and car patrols.
(c) The Street Department is unable to provide adequate snow removal and is
operating equipment uneconomically beyond its normal useful life.
5) Construction of the mall would result in a substantial net increase in revenue to
the Town of Williston after adjustment for reduction in state aid for education due to
higher property values and provision for additional services attributable to the mall.
6) No other municipality has shown that the mall would place an unreasonable bur-
den on its ability to provide municipal or government services.
State of Vermont District Environmental Commission #4 at 25-26.
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